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This study uses ECHP data to give insights on the characteristics of people whose self-assessment 
of labour status differs from that of the LFS. We do some ‘labour accounting’, in order to clarify the 
connection between individual perception and LFS categorisation. We find that discrepancies are 
frequent, regional differences are extremely relevant in explaining them and thus traditional 
statistics may be strongly biased in capturing people’s well being in relationship with their labour 
status. We concentrate then on the most relevant perception errors, above all those connected with 
searching behaviour, in order to explain their determinants. What emerges is a map of social 
characteristics explaining discouragement and passive behaviour. Such an attitude is (paradoxically) 
reinforced by assistance from the state itself, such that it becomes – to a certain extent – 
‘institutionalised’. Finally, we show that our understanding of the relationship between 
misclassification and individual characteristics leads to a reduction in the measurement error to be 
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The unemployment rate is probably the most used indicator of labour market performance and of 
the well-being of an economy as a whole, but in practice it is really difficult to categorise people as 
either in or out of the labour force or as employed/unemployed. To facilitate comparisons of labour 
market performance between countries and over time, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
has set forth guidelines for classifying individuals into different labour market states
1. In general, 
these guidelines have been followed by most statistical bureaus in preparing their labour force 
surveys; moreover, to achieve the goal of international comparability standardised statistics are 
compiled
2. According to ILO definitions, a person is considered unemployed if three requirements 
are satisfied: 1) the person is not working; 2) the person is currently available for work; 3) the 
person is actively seeking for a job.  
 
While most labour economists agree that the first two criteria are quite straightforward, this is not 
the case for the third one, which defines the boundaries between unemployed, discouraged and 
inactive workers. Many studies have shown that the availability and willingness to work might be 
sufficient to categorise a worker as belonging to the labour force, especially in less developed 
countries, where search is usually more costly and where searching behaviour, given the importance 
of the rural sector and of family links, might be less meaningful (Byrne and Strobl, 2001). The issue 
has also been analysed in some developed countries, notably Canada and the US , where again it is 
recognised that correctly identifying those who are not searching according to the standard 
definitions may be difficult. But while in less developed countries the source of confusion is 
probably related to the organisation of the labour market as a whole, in industrialised countries it is 
more likely to be related to the characteristics of specific groups. For instance, Gonul (1992), finds 
evidence that while unemployment and out of the labour force are two distinguishable labour 
market states for women, this is not the case for men: according to Gonul, this happens because 
women are used to stay at home to look after children and thus they are generally more aware of 
whether they are searching or not for a job: if they are at home, looking after children, they are 
obviously not searching, while this might not be the case for men. Clark and Summer (1979), 
analysing a different group, conclude that in the case of teenagers it is not possible to distinguish 
between the two labour market states of unemployed and out of the labour force, while Flinn and 
Heckmann (1983) find opposite evidence for high school white male graduates.  
 
What emerges from this studies is that the distinction between different labour market states is not 
always very clear and well-defined: people may not know how to classify themselves according to 
the standard definitions, or simply may have a perception of their labour market state different from 
that of labour economists; moreover, work and leisure are complex phenomena and they are hard to 
classify according to any definition.  
 
As a consequence, in labour market surveys some inconsistencies might emerge between individual 
responses and the effective behaviour of the respondents.  Were the discrepancies very significant, 
using the standard definitions to orient policy design could then be obviously misleading. Our study 
is an attempt to clarify the determinants of these differences and in this sense may shed some light 
                                                 
1 the latest ILO international definitions of unemployment were adopted in October 1982 by the 13th International 
Conference of Labour Statisticians meeting in Geneva. This was an update and clarification of standards set in 1954.  
2 the four main statistical sources comparing unemployment rates across countries are the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) with its Standardized 
Unemployment Rates (SURs) program, the Statistical Office of the European Communities (Eurostat) and the 
International Labor Office (ILO) itself.  
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on some ‘borderline’ types of workers, unemployed, or inactive individuals, and thus on the 
existing controversy about the inadequacy of official labour market statistics. 
 
More recently, the issue of the discrepancies between official definitions and individuals’ responses 
to labour market surveys has gained a renewed interest, on the wake of the extraordinary labour 
market performance of the US compared to the more modest European one. The argument, at the 
risk of oversimplifying it, is that an accurate comparison of labour market performance between 
different countries should take into account all social, cultural and institutional factors that, though 
difficult to measure, greatly affect labour status perception. For example, differences in social 
welfare and educational systems, in demographic factors and in the attitude towards work and 
leisure may greatly affect the perception one has of his/her own activity status and therefore 
contribute to explain differences in activity rates between countries. If this were the case then 
looking at the official statistics without taking into account these factors would be seriously 
misleading. Commenting on the low unemployment rates in the US, Thurow (1999) points out that  
“nothing good happens by telling anyone official that you are unemployed”, because that would be 
interpreted as a bad signal in a society where “you gain what you deserve”; but this might not be the 
case in a country with a high unemployment rate, where being unemployed is not perceived as the 
individual’s own responsibility. In a very dynamic society, a precarious job might be perceived as a 
real job, but in a society still permeated by a culture of full-time/secure job this might not be the 
case. Thus, an individual occasionally taking some low paid and precarious job might perceive 
himself/herself as employed in the first case but as unemployed in the latter. 
   
The job search itself might have different meanings in different countries: for instance, in a society 
based on strong familiar and social nets, being unemployed might be less dramatic than in a more 
individualistic society; as a consequence the job search might be less active than required by official 
statistics to be classified in the labour force. The individual enjoying such a protection might 
consider himself/herself as truly unemployed while not meeting the official definition of 
unemployed. Or more simply an individual might perceive himself/herself as unemployed even if 
not actively searching for a job just because he/she does not know what steps to take or because 
does not think a suitable job might be available.  
 
The difficulty of comparing official labour market statistics is exacerbated by the fact that the 
structure of most labour markets now differ greatly from the general framework used to derive the 
standard definitions of employed, unemployed and out of the labour force.  This framework was set 
by ILO when the prevailing type of employment was full-time male paid employment and a full 
range of employment protection measures were generally in place (ILO, 1994). Since then, the 
employment situation has greatly changed so that the traditional definitions may no longer be suited 
to capture the complexity of these phenomena. 
 
In the last twenty years the labour markets in all the European countries have undergone a deep 
process of restructuring which has greatly contributed to change the meaning of work and leisure as 
they are generally understood. Many prime age men have lost their jobs in the manufacturing 
sector. This has raised again the issue of an unemployment crisis because the development of the 
service sector, while favouring the feminisation of the labour market, has not been strong enough to 
compensate for the decline of the employment in the traditional industrial sector. In the meantime, 
to face the new unemployment crisis new policy strategies have been implemented, which have 
greatly contributed to make the difference between employment and non-employment much less 
well-defined: part-time and other flexible labour contracts have become the ordinary way to enter 
the labour market in many European countries, while retirement pay-schemes have allowed many 
redundant workers to leave the labour force without suffering the consequences of unemployment.  
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A new, more unified, labour market has emerged in which the fixed and full time job is no longer 
the ordinary form of employment while many unskilled workers, still in working age, have been 
pushed out of the labour force.  
 
Moreover, this process has greatly contributed to affect existing differences in the labour force’s 
attitude and  perception about the traditional concepts of employment and unemployment. One 
might argue that since this process has interested more or less all industrialised countries, this 
should reduce and make less relevant also the cultural and social differences in the perception of 
work and unemployment. Paradoxically, the same forces that undermine the validity of the 
traditional ILO definitions should also work – to a certain extent – in the direction of making them 
more universally applicable. 
But we cannot deny that despite the presence of global forces tending to mitigate and impose a 
convergence in many social and cultural trends, there are still important cultural differences 
affecting the perception a community has of the social status of different labour conditions.  
  
In conclusion, official labour market statistics are likely to be affected by a whole range of 
institutional, cultural and social factors which make their comparison particularly difficult. Our 
problem is then to study the impact of these factors on the validity of labour force categorisation 
and hence of labour force statistics. The European Community Household Panel (ECHP), which 
provides two different definitions of activity status, the standard Eurostat Labour Force Survey 
(LFS) definition following ILO guidelines, and the respondent’s own self-assessment,  can offer 
new insights on the importance of these factors, allowing to identify a separate perception 
component.  
 
Finally, the difference between these two measures can provide insights on the issue of transition 
flows measurement. Confusion between different labour market states is a source of particular 
concern when transition between states is analysed. Some of the observed transitions may simply 
occur because of a change in classification, without any change in the underlying working situation. 
Moreover, changes in ‘real’ labour state not reflected in a corresponding change in classification 
may remain unobserved, or be attributed to a wrong transition. That is, when labour force status is 
observed with error, a bias will arise in the estimates of the transition probabilities
3.  
Suppose there is a ‘true’ state l* for each individual i, based on a latent variable s:  
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where j  can be, for instance, either ‘unemployed’ or ‘employed’ or ‘inactive’,  
Unfortunately, only information on an observed status l is available, where: 
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3 see for instance Poterba & Summers (1995), Hausman, Abrevaya & Scott-Morton (1998)  
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Measurement error is actually composed by two different errors: an interviewer error (mi
I), due to 
coding mistakes, etc., and a respondent error (mi
R), due to ‘wrong’ answers (i.e. answers not 
coherent with reality): 
 
[2’]       ] 1 , 0 [     ,    ] [
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While measurement error mi is normally thought as a random process, and the probability 
jh α therefore given exogenously, we advance the hypothesis that it may be partly explained. We still 
consider the interviewer error to be random, but we try to grasp a systematic component of  mi
R:  
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Suppose transition flows are observed with reference to a self-assessed labour state classification, 
and that the ‘true’ labour force state could be grasped with a little more investigation. This amounts 
to say that an ILO classification, if available, could solve the respondent measurement problem 
altogether, leaving only the interviewer error left. 
On the other hand, suppose only the ILO measure is observed, while the unobserved self-assessed 
classification is thought to be closer to the ‘true’ state of interest.  
In both cases, the problem is that there is no link between the two measures. The difference between 
them is thought of as a purely random process.  
This study, through estimates of 
R m , provides (part of) the missing link, thus reducing the 
unexplained difference to a smaller random error. 
 
 
The paper is organised as follows. In section 1 we introduce the ECHP data and discuss their 
coherence with other labour force statistics. In section 2 we analyse the discrepancies between the 
respondents’ and the LFS definitions of activity status in the ECHP survey. In section 3 we discuss 
their relevance, while in section 4 we investigate their impact on labour force statistics. In section 5 
the framework for our regional analysis is set, while in sections 6 we investigate the determinants of 
the main types of discrepancies found. Section 7 deals with the above mentioned measurement 
errors problem, and finally section 8 contains the conclusions.  
 
 
1. The data 
 
The aim of this section is to present the data and assess their quality by comparing the main labour 
force statistics from the ECHP with those from other EU official sources.  
 
The ECHP is a household panel set by Eurostat, the Statistical Office of the European 
Communities, providing detailed information on a number of demographic, social and economic 
variables of households and individuals since 1994. Citing from Nicoletti and Peracchi (2001), 
“[t]he target population of the ECHP consists of all individuals living in private households within 
the EU. In its first (1994) wave, the ECHP covered about 60,000 households and 130,000 
individuals aged 16+ in 12 countries of the EU (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the UK). Austria, Finland and Sweden 
began to participate later, respectively from the second, third and fourth wave.  
In Belgium and the Netherland, the ECHP was linked from the beginning to already existing 
national panels. In Germany, Luxembourg and the UK, instead, the first three waves of the ECHP 
ran parallel to existing national panels with similar content, namely the German Social Economic  
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Panel (GSOEP), the Luxembourg’s Social Economic Panel (PSELL) and the British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS)”. 
 
When we started this study, wave 1 to 3 (1994, 1995 and 1996) of the User Data Base (UDB) were 
available; wave 4 (1997) has recently been released. Since the panel structure of the data has not 
proved useful, we focus on1996 data, but for Italy and the Netherlands, where we suspect wave 3 
data of being of lower quality (see below), and for which we used 1995 data. Due to a stability 
feature in the perception errors we investigate (see below), we are allowed to suggest that the 
findings of this study are still valid for more recent years: so one of the big disadvantages of large 
household panels – namely huge delays in the publication of data – brings only limited harm to us. 
 
Previous studies (ECHP data quality, second report; Nicoletti and Peracchi, 2001; Peracchi, 2000) 
found that there is no relevant incoherence between the ECHP data on employment and 
unemployment and the LFS statistics, even if in the case of some countries, there are some large 
differences (see Appendix, table A1). Our own elaboration confirms these results: the comparison is 
generally good but the ECHP data, if we exclude Greece, tend to underestimate unemployment rates 
while overestimating activity rates (see Appendix, table A2). In some countries, activity rates 
decrease over time. In Italy the reduction is quite relevant, from 49% in the second wave to 44% in 
the third wave
4. This observed trend cannot be entirely explained by the change in the composition 
of the sample, with older age groups, with lower participation rates, rising relatively to the other 
groups in later waves, and points towards a problem in data quality for at least one wave. This 
motivated our decision to use wave 2 data, since the first figure seems closer to LFS statistics. 
Wave 2 data were also chosen for the Netherlands because of an implausible frequency of one type 





The importance of ECHP data, as it has already been pointed out, is that they contain information 
both on an individual’s self assessed labour status and on his/her LFS classification. The first 
information comes from a question about the individual’s main  activity status. Each of the 
following categories can be chosen: 
 
Table 1: Main activity status, self assessed 
 
Codes Labels 
1  paid employment (15+ hours / week) 
2  paid apprenticeship (15+ hours / week) 
3  training under special schemes related to employment (15+ hours / week) 
4  self-employment (15+ hours / week) 
5  unpaid family (15+ hours / week) 




10  community / military service 
11  other economically inactive 
12  working less than 15 hours 
 
Source: ECHP – UDB, data dictionary and description of variables 
  
                                                 
4 aggregate statistics for wave 1 are not directly comparable with other waves or with other sources due to a problem in 
data weighting.  
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Then, the three macro-categories of employed, unemployed and inactive are formed, according to 
the following rules: 
 
Table 2: Main activity status, reclassification 
 
Codes Labels   
1  normally working (15+ hours / week)  main activity status in (1,…, 5) 
2  unemployed  main activity status = 7 
3  inactive  main activity status in (6, 8, … 12) 
 
Source: ECHP – UDB, data dictionary and description of variables 
  
 
On the basis of this self-classification and of answers to other questions (in particular those related 
to job searching activities), ECHP data provide an additional classification of each individual’s 
activity status according to ILO classification rules as described in the box below (details on this 
variable construction rules are provided in the Appendix). 
 
ILO classification rules 
 
Working Age  
Working age is taken as ages 16 to 59 for females and 16 to 64 for males. 
In Employment  
People are classed as employed by the LFS, if they have done at least one hour of work in the reference week. 
ILO Unemployment  
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) measure of unemployment used throughout this statistics notice refers 
to people without a job who were available to start work in the two weeks following their LFS interview and had 
either looked for work in the four weeks prior to interview or were waiting to start a job they had already obtained. 
This definition of unemployment is in accordance with that adopted by the 14th International Conference of Labour 
Statisticians and promulgated by the ILO in 1987. 
The ILO unemployment rate is the percentage of economically active people who are unemployed on the ILO 
measure.  
Economically Active  
People aged 16 and over who are either in employment or ILO unemployed. 
Economically Inactive  
People who are neither in employment nor unemployed on the ILO measure. This group includes, for example, all 
those who were looking after a home or retired. Although no estimates appear in this bulletin, for other LFS 
analyses, this group would also include all people aged under 16. 
Discouraged Workers  
This is a sub-group of the economically inactive population, defined as those neither in employment nor 
unemployed (on the ILO measure ) who said they would like a job and whose main reason for not seeking work 
was because they believed there were no jobs available. 
Full-time/Part-time  
The classification of employees, self-employed, those on government work-related training programmes and 
unpaid family workers in their main job as full-time or part-time is on the basis of self-assessment. People on 
Government supported training and employment programmes who are at college in the survey reference week are 
classified, by convention, as part-time. 
 
In order to make the two classifications comparable, when we talk of self assessed employed people 
we add those who declare to work less than 15 hours per week (code 12 in table 1 above) to those 
classified as ‘normally working’ (code 1 in table 2 above). 
 
Our aim is to use ECHP data in order to investigate differences between LFS classification and self 
assessed classification of labour status. We will argue that in some cases the existence of such 
differences can be of social concern, and we will then investigate the determinants of this 
misperception.   
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Previous studies found that “around 95% of the individuals are classified identically according to 
the two measures. There are some slight differences related to changes in the questionnaire from 
Wave 1 to Wave 2 (the questionnaire became 'stabilised' from Wave 2 onwards in this respect). For 
instance, the proportion of self-declaring themselves as 'unemployed' according to the main status 
approach but classified as 'inactive' according to the LFS approach is higher in Wave 1 compared to 
Wave 2. Though there are a few anomalies not easily explained”
5.  Fisher et al., (2000), aggregating 
results by country and weighting by population size, found that over 90% of the respondents 
reported the same current and main activity status, and that age and sex seem to account for the 
differences
6. It is recognised that respondents may not agree with the LFS criteria and that, since the 
LFS definition of current activity status gives priority “to any work and unemployment over 
inactivity and to any work as marking a person as employed rather than as unemployed”, then a 
number of features, which could affect the individual’s perception of the activity status, are lost in 
the LFS reclassification. We do believe that differences in the questionnaire between the three 
waves cannot entirely account for the discrepancies found and, following Fisher at Al., we 
investigate the determinants of these discrepancies. 
 
A word must be spent on why we think of this difference as being caused by misperception, rather 
than more generally by an erroneous declaration (misdeclaration). An individual could intentionally 
make a false declaration, for instance in case he/she is employed in the underground economy, and 
wants to hide his/her illegal activity. But in these cases, a good liar would make such a coherent 
false declaration that imputation of LFS activity status on the basis of his/her answers would not 
produce anything discordant. Thus, a discordance is always caused by a misperception, although 
sometimes this is of no social relevance. This also suggests that ECHP data is not suited for an 
analysis of the underground economy. 
 
We do not consider the case of someone holding the ‘right’ perception of his/her labour status but 
erroneously giving a wrong answer to require a special treatment. This is likely to happen in those 
‘fuzzy’ situations as a part-time job involving only a few hours of work a week. Of course we 
expect – as it will be made clear below – such situations to increase the likelihood of a 
misdeclaration. In some cases this appears to be of potential social concern, in some others it seems 
more irrelevant. However, the main point we want to stress is that any misdeclaration implies to a 
certain extent a misperception, if we agree with the LFS classification. We are concerned with those 
misperception that could represent a social problem, and we’ll try to investigate their social and 
economic causes. 
 
If we consider three labour status (employed, unemployed and inactive), there are six possible cases 
of misperception: 
1.  an individual can classify himself/herself as unemployed, but be classified as employed 
according to LFS definitions (hereafter UE, where the first letter refers to the self-definition 
and the latter to LFS status); 
2.  an individual can classify himself/herself as inactive, but be LFS classified as employed 
(IE); 
3. an individual can self-define himself/herself as inactive, but be LFS classified as 
unemployed (IU); 
4. an individual can self-define himself/herself as employed, but be LFS classified as 
unemployed (EU); 
5.  an individual can self-define himself/herself as unemployed, but be LFS classified as 
inactive (UI); 
                                                 
5ECHP data quality. Second report,  pp.58. 
6 we also agree on the importance of sex and age, but only for some type of perception errors (see below)  
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6.  and finally an individual can classify himself/herself as employed, but be classified as 
inactive according to LFS definitions (EI). 
 
We believe that only four out of these six misclassification errors are of interest – namely UI (those 
who are inactive but believe they’re unemployed, probably the single more relevant perception error 
in terms of social consequences), IU (those who are unemployed but believe they’re inactive) , UE 
(those who are currently employed but believe they are unemployed) and IE (those who are 
employed but regard themselves as being inactive).  
 
The decision to ignore the other two groups is motivated by the following. 
There are no EU guys: according to the LFS variable construction rule, it was not possible to be 
classified as LFS unemployed while declaring to be employed. This also confirms that the 
questionnaire was not designed to investigate participation in the underground economy. 
 
The number of EI guys is very small (139 out of 130,611 observations, or 0,1% of the total. 
Moreover, most of them (78%) declare to be working less than 15 hours per week. Thus, we discard 
this group as not relevant.  
 
When the focus is on the four perception errors described above, a further distinction is possible.  
 
Among the people who are classified as LFS inactive, but who perceive themselves as being 
unemployed, some are not searching for a job at all, while others are engaging in a job search, 
although not an active search as required by LFS standards to be classified as unemployed. We call 
the first group UI1 (no search), and the latter UI2 (no active search).  
 
As for what regards people who are classified as LFS unemployed but declare to be inactive, it is 
possible to distinguish between those who pursue a correct search (and thus have all the substantial 
requisites to be ‘real’ unemployed) and those who are classified as LFS unemployed for more 
formal reasons (people that have already been assigned a job, but are waiting to start it, people who 
are awaiting for the results of an application…). We call the first group IU1 (correct search), and 
the latter IU2 (purely conventional reasons). It is clear that it is the first group of most interest, 
since no matter they behave like ‘real’ unemployed, they do not lament their condition. We will 
concentrate only on this group. 
 
UE group (people who are classified as employed but declare to be unemployed) and IE group 
(people who are classified as employed but declare to be inactive) are made only of temporary or 
part-time workers. Here, the difference between self-declaration and the LFS classification has to be 
mainly attributed to the questionnaire design, since the question was about main activity status. That 
is, many people could have correctly identified their main activity status as unemployed or inactive 
(students, retired persons…) even if they have a small or occasional job. However, we still consider 
these groups to  be of interest, because these people are probably the most ‘active’ among their 
respective activity group (unemployed, students, retired people, house workers…). We face two 
interesting a-priori hypothesis on why they do not simply consider themselves to be part-time 
workers. According to the first, the part-time occupation is simply not important enough. People 
declaring this part-time job as their main activity signal they rely more on it. The second hypothesis 
draws from the ‘institutional’ argument we will discuss in details below: give someone a particular 
label (even better if you attach some money to it), and he/she will use it as his/her personal card. It’s 
quite likely that someone holding a pension will declare to be retired, even if still working part-
time. There is a third, less interesting for the purposes of this study, hypothesis, in which people 
making a UE or a IE type misperception signal they decided not to or were not able to hide their 
participation in the underground economy (they are then the most ‘honest’ among the ‘dishonest’).  
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To summarise, we concentrate on the following perception errors: 
•  UI1  :   LFS inactive, self assessed unemployed, no job search; 
•  UI2  :   LFS inactive, self assessed unemployed, no active search; 
•  IU1  :   LFS unemployed, self assessed inactive, active search; 
•  UE  :  LFS part-time workers, self assessed unemployed 
•  IE  :   LFS part-time workers, self assessed inactive 
 
In some sense, the UI groups are the most problematic, since someone who perceives himself as 
unemployed but does not struggle to find a job is likely to share the same unhappiness and 
frustration of a ‘real’ unemployed, but with a smaller probability to get out of this state. It is clear 
that the first perception error (no search at all) is much worse than the second (passive search). 
 
People in the IU group can be labelled as ‘unaware’: we expect them to be included in a social 
safety net that lessens the harsh of unemployment. Being in this group is a priori no good or bad, 
but a sign of (relative) ‘good luck’, with possibly a positive impact on the overall well being of the 
individual. 
 
Finally, as described above, being in the UE or IE group can signal a particular active attitude with 
respect to unemployment or exclusion from the labour force, but also a lack of interest in the part-
time job, if our first hypothesis turns out to be correct. The first attitude is clearly ‘positive’ from a 
social perspective. On the other hand, in the “lack of centrality” hypothesis it is the situation of the 
non misperceptors – those that show a strong interest in their part-time job – that can be 
problematic, since some of them could be forced to make their living out of a part-time work, while 




3. The relevance of misperception  
 
But how relevant are these perception errors? The table below shows that 26.2% of all people who 
perceive themselves as unemployed are recorded as inactive by the official statistics provided by the 
national statistical office (“Indagine trimestrale sulla forza lavoro”) in Italy, thus committing a UI 
type perception error. The frequency of this misperception goes as high as 57.7% in the 
Netherlands, 49.1% in Belgium and just above 40% in Denmark, Austria and Portugal, while it goes 
down to 12.6% in Great Britain and 12.5% in Greece. 
 
Conversely, 4.9% of all people declaring to be inactive are (‘officially’) unemployed in Italy. This 
figure remains high for Spain (4.7%) and Finland (4.3%), reaching a low of 0.8% in Portugal and 
0.2% in Greece.  
 
Moreover, in Italy 4.1% of self assessed unemployed are ‘officially’ working, a perception error 
committed by 19.4% of self assessed unemployed in the Netherlands, and by just 0.7% in France. 
Finally, only 1.4% of self assessed inactive are ‘officially’ working in Italy, while in the 
Netherlands this figure is as high as 15.9%, in Denmark reaches 12.9%, and it goes down to around 
1% in Spain and Greece, and to 0.8% in France.  
                                                 
7 many people choose to work part-time as the optimal choice given their other activities (like bearing children, or 
simply enjoying rents), but we suppose that most people declaring to be part-time workers are forced to make this 
choice, and would opt for a full-time, if they could.   
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Table 3 – Relevance of perception errors 
 
 
*   over self-defined (s.d.) unemployed 
**   over s.d. inactive 
***  over s.d. employed 
  UI* IU** UE*  EU***  EI***  IE**  s.d & LFS 
unempl. * 
 
ITALY  (a)  26.2% 4.9% 4.1% 0.0% 0.0% 1.4%  69.7% 
GERMANY  28.6% 1.9% 3.6% 0.0% 0.0% 8.7%  67.8% 
GREAT  BRITAIN  12.6% 3.6% 4.9% 0.0% 0.1% 7.7%  82.5% 
PORTUGAL  40.2% 0.8% 4.6% 0.0% 0.1% 4.6%  55.2% 
NETHERLANDS(a)  57.7% 1.1%  19.4% 0.0% 0.0%  15.9%  23.0% 
BELGIUM  49.1% 2.0% 6.5% 0.0% 1.0% 4.1%  43.9% 
SPAIN  20.4% 4.7% 2.5% 0.0% 0.0% 1.0%  77.0% 
FRANCE  24.4% 2.5% 0.7% 0.0% 1.1% 0.8%  70.6% 
GREECE  12.5% 0.2% 2.4% 0.0% 0.1% 1.1%  85.2% 
DENMARK  41.8% 2.3% 2.5% 0.0% 0.0%  12.1%  55.8% 
AUSTRIA 41.2%    1.8%  0.0%  0.0%  4.8%  54.3% 
IRLAND  30.2% 2.1% 4.3% 0.0% 0.1% 5.7%  65.3% 
LUXEMBURG  33.3% 1.7% 2.8% 0.0% 0.3% 3.9%  63.9% 
FINLAND  23.3% 4.3% 5.4% 0.0% 0.1% 4.7%  71.3% 
 
1996 (wave 3) data 
(a) 1995 (wave 2) data 
 
 
So, perception errors matter. In particular, ‘bad’ mistakes as UI and UE (when people perceive 
themselves as unemployed, the worst possible state) matter. Moreover, national differences are 
extremely relevant. Finally, traditional statistics may be strongly biased in capturing people’s well 
being in relationship with their labour status. Of all self assessed unemployed, only 70% are also 
LFS classified as such in Italy. This figure goes down to almost 50% in Portugal, Denmark and 
Austria, doesn’t arrive to 44% in Belgium and reaches a bare 23% in the Netherlands! (last 
column).  
 
Moreover, perception errors appear to be quite persistent, with the exception of UE group: around 
50 % of respondents who do not change their labour state from wave 2 to wave 3 still report the 




Table 4 – Persistence of perception errors: erception flows of people who do not change their ILO 




The fact that what counts, in terms of personal well being, is the perceived labour status, rather than 
the true labour status (as classified by LFS standards) is confirmed when looking at the correlation 
of perception errors and satisfaction level
8. Perceiving to be unemployed is worse than perceiving to 
be inactive, given (LFS) inactivity; conversely, perceiving to be inactive is better than perceiving to 
be unemployed, given (LFS) unemployment. Moreover, perceiving to be unemployed is worse – 
and perceiving to be inactive better – than perceiving to be a part-time worker, given the individual 





                                                 
8 the questionnaire asks about the satisfaction with work or main activity, ranging from 1 – not satisfied – to 6 – fully 
satisfied.  
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Figure 1 – Diffusion of perception errors and satisfaction levels 
 
UI are in % of all inactive, IU are in % of all unemployed
































































A first look at the numbers above could suggest a stereotypical interpretation, going down more or 
less like this: “Family links in Italy and Spain are stronger, and thus unemployed persons are more 
likely not to perceive the harshness of their status (high frequency of IU misperception); 
individualism in Great Britain is strong, and thus people tend not to blame others for their personal 
situation, while in Greece this may be due to a weaker state (low frequency of UI misperception); 
labour legislation favouring part-time in the Netherlands explain the sky-high frequency of UE and 
IE misperception in this country”. The remaining of the paper is devoted to better qualify this. 
 
 
4. Misperception and labour force  statistics 
 
At this point, it could be asked how it is possible to rely on traditional statistics as the 
unemployment rate, when overall only around 3 in 4 people who feel unemployed are counted in. 
The fact is: ‘official statistics’ do not necessarily reflect what people feel, they are measuring 
something else. Moreover, some perception errors offset each other. Self-definition and LFS 
classification are linked by the following identities: 
 
[4]  s.d. unemployed = LFS unemployed – IU – EU + UI + UE 
[5]  s.d. employed = LFS employed – IE – UE + EI + EU 
[6]  s.d. inactive = LFS inactive – UI – EI + IU + IE 
 
Let’s confine our attention to the first one. Since EU = 0, it reduces to  
 
[4’]  s.d. unemployed = LFS unemployed – IU  + UI + UE 
 
The intersection set – i.e. the set of people who are at the same time both self assessed and LFS 
unemployed – is small compared to the self assessed set when UI and UE misperception are large, 























However, even if IU, UI and UE may partially offset each other, when statistics based on LFS 
classification are to be used as an estimate for self-perceived unemployment, the risk of big 
mistakes remains high: 
 
Table 5 – Difference between self assessed unemployment and LFS unemployment  
 
   Difference * 
     
ITALY (a)  2.2% 
GERMANY 15.1% 













* (s.d unemployment – LFS 
unemployment) over LFS unemployment 
 
 
5. The regional dimension 
 
We have seen that perception errors differ greatly across countries. They also differ within 
countries, across regions. We want to investigate how and why this happens. However, the number 
of observations is too small to allow a ‘true’ regional analysis (due to the relative small incidence of 
each type of perception error). We need then a territorial criterion to aggregate regions. We used the 
EU structural funds objective 1, 2 and 5b eligibility status of each region. These objectives are the 
only geographical objectives of the 1996-2001 structural funds, since obj. 3, 5a and 6 refer to any 
EU region,  regardless of its characteristics. Objective 1 was aimed to promoting the development 





self assessed unemployed 
LFS unemployed  
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was aimed to supporting the economic and social conversion of areas seriously affected by 




Since objective 5b eligibility appeared to be decisive only in a handful of regions, our final 
classification is based only on obj. 1 and 2 eligibility. 
Thus, each region in our dataset can be one classified in one of the following groups: 
 
Table 6 – Structural funds eligibility and regional classification 
 









1  Declining Industrial Regions  N  P  46,087  35.29 
2 Agro-Industrial  Regions  P  P  30,364  23.25 
3 Metropolitan  Regions  N  N  5,043  3.86 
4 Agricultural  Regions  T  N  45,123  34.55 
(missing) 3,994  3.05     
total 126,617  100.00    
N = not eligible; P = partially eligible; T = totally eligible 
 
 
Regions in group 1 are those who are only partially eligible for objective 2b. We may call them 
‘Declining Industrial Regions’. Regions in  group 2 are partially eligible for both objectives. We 
will refer to these mixed-specialisation regions as ‘Agro-Industrial Regions’. Regions in group 3 are 
London, Paris, Bruxelles and Amsterdam regions: we will call them ‘Metropolitan Regions’. 
Finally, group 4 regions are mainly ‘Agricultural Regions’, with no objective 2 areas. It is important 
to note that these regions are fully eligible for objective 1 structural funds contribution. 
The full list of EU regions with group belonging is reported in the Appendix. Note that region of 
residence information is not available for German and Dutch data. Thus, we can only use national 
data on structural funds distribution for these two countries. Since Germany and the Netherlands are 
on the whole partially eligible for both objective 1 and objective 2b contributions, all observations 
for these countries are classified in group 2.  
 
Sample activity rates and participation rates are more or less similar across the four groups, with the 
exception of Agricultural regions, where they are significantly lower. Agro-Industrial regions have 
the lowest sample unemployment rate, followed by Declining Industrial regions and Metropolitan 
regions. Again, Agricultural regions have the worse figures, with an unemployment rate of 13.6%.  
 
Agro-Industrial regions have the highest figure for UI1 (LFS inactive, self assessed unemployed, no 
job search) and IE (LFS part-time workers, self assessed inactive ) perception errors. Declining 
Industrial regions and Metropolitan regions have the highest incidence of IU errors. 
 
                                                 
9with the new Framework Programme of the European Commission (2002-2006) objective names, goals and targets 
have been changed  
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Table 7 – Misperception and regional classification 
 
  Macro-regions 
Misperception  Declining Industrial  Agro-Industrial  Metropolitan  Agricultural 
          
UI1  *  355    1.9%  672 5.5%  54 2.6%  477 2.2% 
UI2  *  332 1.8%  203 1.7%  35 1.7%  389 1.8% 
IU  **  574 24.7%  248 19.1%  65 24.0%  558 17.4% 
UE  ***  105 0.4%  207 1.2%  7 0.3%  121 0.6% 
IE  ***  820 3.2% 1008 6.0%  36 1.3%  561 2.7% 
          
participation  rate   60.2%   59.5%   58.7%   52.4% 
unemployment  rate   8.4%   7.2%   9.2%    13.6% 
activity  rate   55.1%   55.2%   53.3%   45.3% 
          
* over  inactive 
** over  unemployed 
*** over  employed 
 
 
6. The determinants of misperception 
 
We do not provide a formal theory of misperception. We simply divide the determinants of 
misperception in three categories: 
•  institutional determinants 
•  economic determinants, and 
•  social determinants 
 
Institutional factors refer to those situations when there is a social recognition of a particular labour 
status (as in the case of unemployment benefits, or pensions). It can happen that LFS classification 
does not correspond to this ‘social visa’. For instance, one person can receive a scholarship, but still 
work a few hours a week in order to increase his/her income. In such cases, we expect the existence 
of these allowances to increase the probability of a misperception.  
 
Economic and social factors affect misperception in many ways. To start with, they normally affect 
the institutional factors
10. In the case of the UI group, they are directly linked with the ‘victimisation 
hypothesis’, according to which beyond a certain threshold of (perceived) economic and social 
distress individuals tend to blame the society for their personal situation, and thus switch the 
responsibility for an improvement from themselves to the state. In the case of IU group, they are 
connected with the safety net effect described above.  
 
In order to investigate the determinants of the four categories of misperception described above, we 
run separate logit regressions, comparing each misperception group with the corresponding correct 
perception group. Thus, our logit regression for the UI compares being an UI with being a II, i.e. 
declaring to be unemployed versus declaring to be inactive, given that the individual is classified as 
an LFS inactive. The logit regression for the IU compares declaring to be inactive versus declaring 
to be unemployed, given that the individual is classified as an LFS unemployed, and so forth. Note 
that UE and IE are both regressed against EE: thus, IE observations are excluded from UE 
regression, and vice versa. 
 
                                                 
10 but since this causal relationship differ from country to country due to different legislation on social protection – and 
we put observations from different countries together – it is still convenient to include the institutional factors among 
the regressors.  
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Regressors include personal information – sex, age, citizenship, legal status (whether one is 
married), instruction – household information – dimension of household, existence of children to be 
cared of, location in an area with crime or vandalism problems – and income information. 
 
Now, it is important to note that misperception may reveal something about work determination, 
and thus about unobservable ability. In the case of the UI group for example, it is intuitive to link 
misperception to the individual being a ‘low type’ worker. Including income information among the 
regressors could thus lead to an endogeneity problem, since income may in turn depend on such 
determination, or unobserved ability (and thus on the perception error). 
 
Fortunately, this is not the case in the UI and IU regressions, since we are confident to assume that 
being an UI rather than an II – or a IU rather than a UU – does not affect income. The main reason 
is that there is no work income here. Non-work private income (capital income, private transfers) 
can be thought to be independent of whether one admits or not to be inactive, or unemployed
11. 
Unemployment benefits and other social receipts are not generally granted after a simple 
declaration to be unemployed. 
 
Conversely, IE and UE regressions are affected by this endogeneity problem, which introduces a 
correlation between work income and the errors. We tackle this problem by instrumenting  income 
in the IE and UE regressions. 
 
Although the questionnaire asks important questions about health status and satisfaction level, we 
do not include any of these variables among the regressors, since the number of missing data 
becomes significant, and selection biases could be introduced. Country dummies are included. 
 
The full list of variables used in the regressions is reported in the table below: 
 
Table 8 – Explanatory variables 
Code Description  dummy  UI  IU  UE  IE  IV  income 
              
PE003  LFS MAIN ACTIVITY DURING CURRENT YEAR             
pe003_4 *  discouraged  *  x  o         
PE005  TOTAL HOURS WORKING / WEEK        o  o  o 
pe005sq squared        o  o  o 
HD004  EQUIVALISED SIZE, OECD SCALE    o  o    o   
HI100ecu  TOTAL NET HOUSEHOLD INCOME    o  o  o  o   
hi100esq squared    o  o  o  o   
PI110ECU  TOTAL NET INCOME FROM WORK        o  o   
pi110esq squared        o  o   
PI131ecu  UNEMPLOYMENT RELATED BENEFITS    o  o  o     
PI131esq squared    o  o  o     
PI132ecu  OLD-AGE / SURVIVORS' BENEFITS    o  o    o   
PI132esq squared    o  o    o   
PI133ECU   FAMILY-RELATED ALLOWANCES    o  o    o   
PI133esq squared    o  o    o   
PI134ECU  SICKNESS/INVALIDITY BENEFITS    o  o    o   
PI134esq squared    o  o    o   
PI135ECU  EDUCATION-RELATED ALLOWANCES    o  o    o   
PI135esq squared    o  o    o   
HF002  IS THE HOUSEHOLD ABLE TO MAKE ENDS MEET             
hf002_no  * with some difficulty - with great difficulty *        o  o   
HF013 
MONEY LEFT FOR THE HOUSEHOLD TO SAVE (CONSIDERING 
HOUSEHOLD'S INCOME AND EXPENSES)             
hf013_2    * no or very little *  x  o  o  o  o   
HA022  IS THERE CRIME OR VANDALISM IN THE AREA             
                                                 
11 non-work income could depend on  whether one is unemployed rather that inactive. For instance, inactive people 
could have decided to drop out of the labour force exactly because of sufficient capital income. Elderly people could 
receive private transfers from their relatives. But the distinction here is whether one declares to be unemployed, rather 
than inactive.  
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ha022_1  * yes *  x  o  o  o  o  o 
HL002  CHILDREN LOOKED AFTER ON A REGULAR BASIS             
hl002_1  * yes *  x  o  o  o  o   
PD003  AGE OF THE INDIVIDUAL    o  o  o  o  o 
pd003sq squared    o  o  o  o  o 
PD004  SEX OF THE INDIVIDUAL             
pd004_2   * female *  x  o  o  o  o  o 
PD005  MARITAL STATUS OF THE PERSON             
pd005_1   * married *  x  o  o  o  o   
PT001  HAS THE PERSON BEEN IN EDUCATION OR TRAINING RECENTLY             
pt001_1   * yes *  x  o  o    o   
PT022 
HIGHEST LEVEL OF GENERAL OR HIGHER EDUCATION 
COMPLETED             
pt022_3   * Less than second stage of secondary education  *  x  o  o  o  o   
PH001  HEALTH OF THE PERSON IN GENERAL            o 
PM008  CITIZENSHIP              
pm008_ex   * Other citizenship (Extra-EU) or Not national, but citizenship unkown *  x  o  o  o  o  o 
EMPL12  S.D. EMPLOYED IN THE LAST 12 MONTHS  x  o  o       
PE017  USE OF A FOREIGN LANGUAGE IN CURRENT JOB             
pe017_1  * yes *            o 
 
 
The UI group 
 
A fundamental variable we introduce in the regression of the likelihood of declaring to be 
unemployed, when inactive, is whether the individual does not search for a job because he/she is 
discouraged. We expect being discouraged to affect positively this likelihood. As it turns out, this is 
the single most important factor in explaining this type of misperception. 
 
Among the income variables, we include data on total net household income and on personal social 
allowances. Household income could affect UI misperception in two ways: living in a poor 
household could increase awareness and personal responsibility, and thus lower the likelihood of a 
misperception, or it could increase the attribution of the ultimate responsibility of such an 
uncomfortable situation to the state, and thus increase the likelihood of a misperception. Hence, a 
positive coefficient would support the ‘victimisation hypothesis’. The same applies to other 
indicators of social distress, such as localisation in a low-security area and a dummy variable 
signalling whether the household does not manage to save money.  
 
Social receipts are introduced as control variables. Unfortunately, since German data on these 
income variables are missing, we have to drop all German observations from our sample. We run a 
separate regression for this country
12, and investigate whether the other effects differ significantly 
from other Agro-Industrial regions (recall all German observations belong to the same group, since 
region of living information is also missing). We obviously expect unemployment benefits to 
increase the likelihood of a misperception, and other social allowances related to inactivity status to 
decrease it. However, the size of these effects and their variability across regions could shed light 
on the importance of what we called the ‘institutional effect’. 
 
                                                 
12 data are available on request  
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UI
Number of  18310 9041 2065 21388





















pe003_4 17.002 3.889 10.859 26.620 12.92 5.562 198.050 30.042 21.50 14.321 5.825 79.331 17.11 2.435 12.946 22.615
hd004 1.003 0.098 0.828 1.214 0.937 0.080 0.793 1.108 0.991 0.266 0.585 1.678 1.189 0.067 1.065 1.327
hi100ecu 0.996 0.001 0.995 0.998 0.999 0.001 0.998 1.001 0.997 0.001 0.994 1.000 0.999 0.001 0.997 1.000
hi100esq 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
pi131ecu 1.070 0.008 1.054 1.087 1.054 0.008 1.039 1.070 1.069 0.012 1.046 1.092 1.141 0.013 1.117 1.166
pi131esq 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 0.000 0.999 0.999
pi132ecu 0.970 0.006 0.958 0.981 0.988 0.003 0.981 0.995 0.963 0.016 0.932 0.996 0.915 0.013 0.889 0.942
pi132esq 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
pi133ecu 0.999 0.004 0.991 1.007 0.995 0.007 0.981 1.009 0.991 0.012 0.967 1.015 0.984 0.036 0.916 1.056
pi133esq 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.999 1.001
pi134ecu 0.976 0.007 0.962 0.990 0.994 0.002 0.990 0.999 1.011 0.029 0.956 1.070 0.902 0.020 0.864 0.943
pi134esq 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.999 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
pi135ecu 0.901 0.033 0.838 0.968 0.946 0.035 0.881 1.017 3.254 2.741 0.624 16.965 0.834 0.154 0.580 1.198
pi135esq 1.001 0.000 1.000 1.001 1.001 0.001 0.999 1.002 0.760 0.144 0.525 1.102 1.002 0.003 0.997 1.008
ha022_1 1.288 0.226 0.914 1.816 1.005 0.130 0.779 1.295 1.144 0.422 0.555 2.359 0.803 0.116 0.605 1.066
hf013_2 1.027 0.141 0.785 1.344 1.274 0.139 1.028 1.577 1.076 0.484 0.445 2.598 1.244 0.191 0.921 1.680
hl002_1 1.072 0.385 0.530 2.168 2.015 0.636 1.086 3.742 1.006 0.972 0.151 6.691 1.540 0.474 0.843 2.814
pd003 1.133 0.039 1.060 1.212 1.446 0.067 1.321 1.583 1.006 0.067 0.883 1.147 1.147 0.031 1.088 1.210
pd003sq 0.998 0.000 0.997 0.999 0.995 0.001 0.994 0.996 1.000 0.001 0.998 1.001 0.998 0.000 0.997 0.999
pd004_2 0.442 0.074 0.318 0.615 0.539 0.090 0.388 0.748 1.755 0.791 0.725 4.247 0.340 0.046 0.261 0.444
pd005_1 0.389 0.074 0.268 0.564 0.829 0.151 0.580 1.186 0.899 0.500 0.302 2.675 0.161 0.027 0.116 0.224
pt001_1 0.222 0.049 0.145 0.341 0.425 0.106 0.261 0.692 0.412 0.335 0.084 2.028 0.090 0.016 0.063 0.129
pt022_3 0.870 0.116 0.670 1.130 0.862 0.096 0.693 1.073 1.046 0.365 0.527 2.073 0.875 0.115 0.676 1.133
pm008_ex 2.405 1.083 0.995 5.813 1.194 0.356 0.665 2.142 1.880 0.971 0.684 5.172
empl12 2.805 0.435 2.069 3.802 2.921 0.640 1.901 4.488 3.299 1.491 1.361 7.999 3.457 0.515 2.582 4.628
Table 9 - UI regression
dropped (predicts failure perfectly): 
66 obs. not used












The discouragement effect and the victimisation hypothesis 
 
As we anticipated, discouragement is the single most important factor in explaining this type of 
misperception. Being discouraged increases the odds ratio of an order of magnitude. The effect is 
stronger in Metropolitan regions, which is what it would be expected.  
Discouraged people don’t consider themselves completely out of the labour force: they simply 
assume a more passive attitude. If we think of human action as the ability of using tools in order to 
reach goals (either consciously or unconsciously) we could say that the process of dropping out of 
the labour force involves two stages. People first loose the tool, then the goal itself. This is 
confirmed by the fact that almost 63% of all discouraged people in our sample declare to be 
unemployed. 
 
Age is also very important, with a 13% increase in the odds ratio in Declining Industrial regions for 
each additional year, and almost 50% increase in Agro-Industrial regions. This can be interpreted 
following the discouragement hypothesis. As times goes by, search efforts are reduced. Moreover, 
if actions are decided rationally, they should be positively linked to their expected benefits. Since 
search is costly (and it becomes even more so with age), the likelihood of getting a job decreases 
with age, and expected benefits from a job also decrease (at least because expected remaining 
lifetime decreases) the intensity of the job search should diminish. When it falls below a threshold, 
the individual is not classified anymore as unemployed by LFS rules, while continuing to be 
interested in getting a job. 
 
The other side of this psychological interpretation is that a recent period of work should increase the 
feeling of being unemployed, even if no search is conducted. In some sense, we could say that long-
term unemployed share with recently unemployed people the same tendency to ‘passive’ behaviour. 
Individuals keep a ‘memory’ of what they recently did, and this affects the perception of their 
present situation. Thus, if they were unemployed, it is likely that they hold the impression they 
should still be considered so, even if they are not performing an active search anymore. On the 
other hand, if they were employed, it is possible that they hold the impression they should be given 
another job, no matter what they do in order to get it. The result is the same: an inclination towards 
UI type misperception. This is confirmed by the positive coefficient of the variable ‘empl12’ (a 
dummy signalling whether the individual declared at least once to be employed in the 12 months 
preceding the interview), with a three times increase in the odds ratio. Having reached the goal (of a 
job) once can induce people to think they gained a permanent right to it. 
 
This is clearly linked with the ‘victimisation hypothesis’ we already introduced. When people stop 
searching for a job, while still thinking they are entitled to one, they are assuming the society should 
take care for themselves. There are other pieces of evidence supporting this interpretation. First of 
all, total household income affects misperception in a negative (and almost linear over the range 
considered) way. Poor people are thus more likely to be affected by a UI perception error. 
Immigrants are slightly less likely to commit this error
13, coherently with the intuition they have 
probably less claims towards a society that is already hosting them. 
 
Since the victimisation hypothesis is strongly linked to the concept of responsibility, we should 
expect UI misperception to be less common in more liberal countries, where the stress on 
individualism is stronger. We believe this phenomenon is partly due to cultural reasons and 
education, and partly to the fact that discouragement becomes more costly when the social safety 
net is weaker. Thus, discouragement should be less common in more liberal countries
14. This trend 
is found in the data: being in Great Britain for instance reduces the odds ratio by a half in Declining 
                                                 
13 in Germany very are more likely  to commit it, with an odds ratio 3 times higher. 
14 on the other side, deep discouragement could well be more widespread   
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Industrial regions and Agricultural regions, and by almost a factor of ten in Agro-Industrial 
regions
15. On the opposite, living in more socialist countries like Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Denmark or Finland increases the odds ratio by two to three times. 
 
Women are much less likely to commit a UI error (odds ratio are reduced by roughly a half
16). Only 
in Metropolitan regions this effect is not relevant, as gender becomes less important in determining 
attitude towards life in general. Also, being married reduces the likelihood of an error. The effect is 
stronger in Agricultural regions, where marriage is a stronger social convention, and is not relevant 
in Metropolitan regions, where it is weaker. 
 
Moreover, the discouragement effect is much stronger for males than for females. Its multiplicative 
effect on the odds ratio is 2 to 5 times stronger for males than for females. Age also has a stronger 
effect for males. 
 





While having a low educational level does not alter significantly the likelihood of making a UI type 
misperception, having been in education or training in the months before the interview reduces it 
dramatically
17. In Agricultural regions this effect amounts to a tenfold reduction, in Declining 
Industrial regions it amounts to a four times reduction, while in the other regions it halves the 
likelihood of an error. 
 
Institutional factors affect the odds ratio in the way we presumed. Each one hundred ecus increase 
in unemployment benefits increases it by 5 to 7 percent (14% in Agricultural regions). The effect is 
almost linear. On the other hand, each one hundred ecus increase in old age and survivor’s benefits 
decreases the odds ratio by 2 to 4 percent (almost 10% in Agricultural regions). Sickness and 
invalidity benefits have an effect similar to that of pensions, with a decrease of the odds ratio of 1 to 
2 percent (almost 10% in Agricultural regions) every 100 ecus increase in the benefits. Education 
related allowances do not appear to be significant in most regions. When they are, they decrease the 
odds ratio, as expected. 
 
The interesting thing here is that socio-institutional factors (education and social benefits) have a 
much stronger effect in Agricultural regions. These are more traditional societies, where the 
distinction of different roles is probably more relevant. 
 
No search and bad search 
 
When running separate regressions for UI1 (no search) and UI2 (no active search) groups, the main 
thing to be noted is that the discouragement effect appears not to be significant for the first group, 
while very strong for the latter. This is highly reasonable, and confirms our interpretation that UI2 
group is partly made of ‘latent unemployed’. Bring just a little degree of confidence to the 42% of 
UI2 guys who declare to be discouraged, and they will be classified as unemployed. Overall, 
unemployment figure in the EU could go up as high as 0.6% because of this effect. 
 
                                                 
15 due to collinearity, some country dummies are dropped in each regressions. 
16 data on gender regressions are available on request 
17 we include this variable among the institutional factors since it involves a ‘formal’ recognition of an inactivity status. 
This is clearly very different from the overall level of education.  
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Table 10 – Discouragement and search 
 
 UI1 UI2 
    
discouraged   10.0 %  42.1 % 
other inactive   90.0 %  57.9 % 
    
total   100.0 %  100.0 % 
 
 














pe003_4 1.42 0.70 0.54 3.73 25.49 5.78 16.34 39.76 0.38 0.21 0.13 1.12 28.22 10.85 13.29 59.95
hi100ecu 1.00 0.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.01
pd003 1.12 0.04 1.04 1.21 1.19 0.06 1.07 1.32 1.34 0.06 1.23 1.46 1.70 0.14 1.44 1.99
pd004_2 0.45 0.10 0.29 0.69 0.51 0.11 0.33 0.78 0.62 0.10 0.45 0.86 0.51 0.16 0.28 0.94
pd005_1 0.44 0.10 0.28 0.68 0.45 0.12 0.27 0.75 0.79 0.14 0.56 1.12 1.02 0.38 0.49 2.11
pt001_1 0.17 0.05 0.09 0.29 0.43 0.11 0.26 0.71 0.32 0.09 0.18 0.55 1.07 0.42 0.50 2.30













pe003_4 0.43 0.41 0.08 3.22 49.61 33.28 13.32 184.74 1.65 0.34 1.10 2.46 20.28 3.34 14.69 28.00
hi100ecu 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.01 1.00 0.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
pd003 0.97 0.09 0.81 1.17 1.16 0.14 0.92 1.46 1.16 0.04 1.09 1.23 1.11 0.04 1.02 1.20
pd004_2 1.07 0.57 0.38 3.04 2.89 1.81 0.85 9.88 0.37 0.06 0.27 0.51 0.49 0.09 0.34 0.71
pd005_1 2.03 1.41 0.52 7.88 0.53 0.38 0.13 2.18 0.20 0.04 0.13 0.30 0.28 0.06 0.19 0.43
pt001_1 0.46 0.36 0.10 2.11 0.55 0.61 0.06 4.80 0.16 0.04 0.10 0.26 0.10 0.03 0.06 0.17
empl12 1.48 0.91 0.45 4.92 5.40 3.86 1.33 21.92 2.85 0.47 2.06 3.93 0.83 0.15 0.58 1.18
Declining Industrial regions Agro-Industrial regions







18335 18335 9049 9049
Agricultural regions




























The IU group 
 
When regressing for the IU misperception group (those who declare to be inactive, but are classified 
as LFS unemployed, since they perform a correct job search), we have to drop the discouragement 
variable (LFS inactive because discouraged), since it is clearly correlated with the dependent 
variable (1 if LFS inactive, 0 otherwise). All other variables are the same we used for the UI 
regressions. 
 
In some sense this perception error is the opposite of the UI one. Here, people are 
underemphasizing their efforts, rather than overemphasizing them: we thus expect most variables to 
affect the odds ratio in the opposite direction.  
 
However, evidence on the discouragement effect is mixed. On one hand, total household income, as 
well as the savings dummy, are not significant. On the other hand, the age effect and the previous-
employment effect confirm our hypothesis. In analysing the UI group, we found out that older 
people tend to overemphasise, and we related this to the discouragement effect. Here, data show 
that older people are less likely to underemphasise (commit a IU error): the effect is quite  
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important, with a decrease in the odds ratio that can reach –20% in Agro-Industrial regions. 
Moreover, it is much more significant for men then for women. 
 
Having experienced a period of employment in the 12 months before the interview slashes the odds 
ratio to roughly a third. 
 
The other effects also work in the way we supposed, i.e. in the opposite direction relative to the UI 
group. Each 100 ecus increase in unemployment benefits reduces the likelihood of a IU perception 
error of around 5%, while each 100 ecus increase in pensions increases it of 2-4%, thus confirming 
the existence of an important institutional effect. Family related allowances are important only in 
Agricultural regions, where they increase the odds ratio of almost 10%.  
 
Everywhere, being a woman increases the likelihood of a IU misperception (from 2 to as high as 5 
times)
 18. Also, being married leads to a 3 to 4 times increase, and this is particular true for women. 
This could be due, as for the UI misperception, to a smaller need for employment due to a social 
and family structure that, to a certain extent, takes care of women, and to cultural traditions 
suggesting a woman to declare to be inactive (student, involved with housework…), rather than 
unemployed, even if she is looking for a job.  
 
The separate regression for German observations (see above) is of no special interest.
19
                                                 
18 data on gender regressions are available on request 
19 data are available on request. The only striking feature is the effect of the dummy indicating possession of a home 




Table 12 - IU regression
IU
Number of  2322 963 270 3202





















hd004 0.915 0.078 0.774 1.083 0.948 0.126 0.730 1.231 0.982 0.196 0.663 1.452 0.979 0.063 0.863 1.112
hi100ecu 1.002 0.001 1.000 1.004 1.000 0.003 0.995 1.005 1.001 0.002 0.997 1.004 1.000 0.002 0.996 1.004
hi100esq 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
pi131ecu 0.951 0.009 0.933 0.969 0.954 0.013 0.929 0.979 0.954 0.015 0.926 0.984 0.944 0.019 0.908 0.982
pi131esq 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.001
pi132ecu 1.037 0.012 1.014 1.060 1.062 0.039 0.989 1.141 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.044 0.020 1.006 1.084
pi132esq 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 0.000 0.999 1.000 6.817 0.952 5.184 8.964 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
pi133ecu 1.012 0.008 0.996 1.028 1.029 0.011 1.008 1.051 0.981 0.024 0.935 1.028 1.093 0.030 1.036 1.153
pi133esq 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.001 0.999 0.000 0.998 1.000
pi134ecu 0.997 0.018 0.962 1.033 0.991 0.021 0.950 1.033 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.037 0.038 0.966 1.114
pi134esq 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.147 0.017 1.113 1.181 1.000 0.001 0.999 1.001
pi135ecu 1.013 0.039 0.939 1.092 1.073 0.057 0.967 1.190 0.544 0.150 0.317 0.936 6.236 8.819 0.390 99.695
pi135esq 1.000 0.001 0.999 1.002 1.000 0.001 0.997 1.003 1.029 0.012 1.006 1.053 0.833 0.194 0.528 1.313
ha022_1 1.398 0.225 1.019 1.917 1.730 0.400 1.100 2.722 1.512 0.635 0.664 3.443 1.153 0.158 0.882 1.508
hf013_2 1.131 0.194 0.809 1.583 0.630 0.147 0.399 0.996 0.414 0.223 0.144 1.192 0.884 0.152 0.631 1.239
hl002_1 1.009 0.326 0.536 1.899 0.657 0.424 0.185 2.328 3.569 3.454 0.536 23.78 0.663 0.265 0.303 1.449
pd003 0.901 0.038 0.829 0.979 0.776 0.052 0.680 0.885 1.436 0.217 1.067 1.932 0.987 0.039 0.913 1.067
pd003sq 1.001 0.001 1.000 1.002 1.003 0.001 1.001 1.005 0.995 0.002 0.991 0.999 1.000 0.001 0.999 1.001
pd004_2 3.181 0.505 2.331 4.341 2.036 0.492 1.268 3.270 1.495 0.585 0.695 3.218 5.163 0.775 3.847 6.930
pd005_1 3.300 0.664 2.225 4.896 4.060 1.280 2.189 7.531 3.533 1.756 1.334 9.359 4.439 0.822 3.088 6.382
pt001_1 2.067 0.355 1.477 2.893 2.875 0.677 1.812 4.561 1.570 0.768 0.602 4.096 6.151 1.056 4.394 8.610
pt022_3 1.190 0.184 0.879 1.611 0.768 0.182 0.483 1.221 0.660 0.257 0.308 1.418 1.327 0.191 1.000 1.761
pm008_ex 1.101 0.484 0.465 2.606 1.242 0.665 0.435 3.547 0.576 0.364 0.166 1.991 26.922 20.363 6.113 118.560
empl12 0.347 0.061 0.246 0.490 0.375 0.103 0.219 0.642 0.271 0.108 0.124 0.593 0.379 0.072 0.261 0.550
















This section is devoted to finding a solution to a problem that probably does not deserve a solution. 
This is because we had a strong a-priori belief that income, and in particular work income, could 
affect the probability of a UE or a IE misperception (declaring to be unemployed or inactive while 
being recorded as employed by LFS standards). Including work income in these regressions could 
lead – as explained above – to an endogeneity problem, because the UE and IE types of 
misperception could reveal the individual as a particularly ‘active’ kind of unemployed, or retired, 
etc. Being ‘active’ in this sense could in turn be linked with motivation, or intrinsic ability, that also 
affect work income. Other components of income, as unemployment benefits or inactivity-related 
allowances are not affected by this endogeneity problem, as previously explained. However, it turns 
out that work income is not significant in the UE and IE regressions. In order to prove this result, 
however, we have to tackle the endogeneity problem. 
 
We include among the regressors two ECHP variables as proxies for motivation: a dummy 
signalling whether the household is able to make ends meet only with difficulty, and a dummy 
signalling whether the household is able to save no or very little money. Our hypothesis is that 
being in financial distress adds to motivation (although, it must be noted, the reverse is not always 
true). Ability is only partially proxied by education
20. We thus consider the main problem to be the 
correlation of income and ability, and look for variables correlated with income, but not with 
ability, that may be used as instruments. 
 
The number of hours worked per week, the presence of crime or vandalism in the area, age, sex, 
citizenship and health status of the individual
21, plus the use of a foreign language in the current job 
seem to satisfy these two constraints. It is easy to argument that sex, citizenship and – to a certain 
degree – age and health status do not affect ability. Ability could be correlated with the number of 
hours worked, but the relationship is not clear (a ‘good type’ worker should work more, or be able 
to reach the same goals working less?). The use of a foreign language could signal ability. 
However, we are not concerned here with skills that can be learned with formal education or 
practice. Much more, we are interested in the intrinsic ability that makes the difference between two 
individuals with the same level of education, or belonging to the same social class, or with the same 
knowledge of a foreign language. We believe that is (relatively) easy to learn a foreign language, 
when needed, and thus suppose that this variable could be used as an instrument for income. 
 
Clearly, all of these variables are strongly correlated with motivation. We think the problem with 
motivation is less relevant than with ability, because we already include two good proxies for the 
first unobservable in the regressions. Moreover, we do not see any other variable that could work as 
an instrument with respect to motivation. In the worst case, we solve only half of the problem. 
Moreover, as already anticipated, the issue appears to be relevant only theoretically, since the two 
income variables are never significant in the UE and IE regressions, both with and without the use 
of the instruments for unobserved ability. It appears unlikely that instrumenting for motivation 
could overturn this result. 
 
                                                 
20 Our variable for education is a simple dummy signalling whether the individual completed less than a second stage of 
secondary education (ISCED 0-2). 
21 including information on health increases the number of missing data, but the scarcity of instruments justifies it. 
The percentage of missing data on health status is reported below: 
 
Germany  1.9%    Belgium  0.8%    United-Kingdom  12.1%     Greece  2.4%    Austria  0.0% 
Denmark  0.1%    Luxembourg  0.4%    Ireland  0.3%     Spain  1.3%    Finland  8.6% 
The Netherlands  0.0%    France  0.7%    Italy  0.0%     Portugal  0.8%         
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So, we run two separate tobit regressions for income (total household income and personal work 
income) on the instruments
22, and include the predicted value in the UE and IE regressions. In order 
to obtain good estimates for the standard errors of this two income coefficients, we boostrap them. 
  
 
The UE and IE groups 
 
Here, we want to describe the characteristics of part-time workers who declare to be unemployed, 
or inactive, and try to give a tentative explanation of the reasons behind this perception. The 
alternative of course is stating the main activity is the part-time job itself. 462 people – or 13.7% – 
out of 3367 part-time workers in facts declare the part-time job as their main activity, while 2461 – 
or 73.1% – declare to be inactive and 444 – or 13.2% – declare to be unemployed. 
 




We want to test the two hypothesis we discussed above – namely the “lack of centrality” and the 
‘institutional’ explanation.  
Since the importance of a certain activity is directly linked to the amount of time devoted to it, and 
to the resources it generates, we expect that the first hypothesis would imply a strong positive 
coefficient for the number of hours worked and the work income variables. On the other hand, the 
‘institutional’ hypothesis would imply a positive coefficient for social allowances. After controlling 
for the usual social and demographic conditions, we conclude that there is a slight evidence in 
favour of the ‘institutional’ hypothesis, while there is no evidence supporting the “lack of 
centrality” one. 
 
Financial distress is relevant in declaring to be unemployed (we would say ‘underemployed’) only 
in group 1 (Declining Industrial) regions, where it increases the odds ratio of as much as 20 times! 
Being a foreigner can sometimes increase the likelihood of declaring to be unemployed, and 
decrease the likelihood of declaring to be inactive. The country dummy for the Netherlands is 
extremely significant (90n times increase in the odds ratio for the UE group, and 4.5 times increase 
for the IE group). 
 
 
                                                 
22 see Appendix 
23 another possibility would be to regress UE people against self assessed unemployed not working at all, and IE people 
against self assessed inactive not working at all. This choice would be functional to trying to understand why some 
unemployed, or some inactive, work and some others don’t, while we’re here interested in why these people don’t state 
their main activity status as worker.  
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Table 13 - UE regression
UE
Number of 
obs. used 224 400 223
















pe005 0.517 0.267 0.188 1.425 1.017 0.518 0.375 2.760 0.321 0.195 0.097 1.056
hi100hat 1.251 0.951 0.277 5.655 1.080 0.223 0.716 1.628 0.815 0.288 0.404 1.644
hi100hsq 0.999 0.001 0.997 1.001 1.000 0.000 0.999 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.999 1.001
pi110hat 1.271 0.771 0.382 4.234 0.977 0.246 0.593 1.608 1.591 0.738 0.634 3.993
pi110hsq 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.001 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
pi131ecu 1.227 0.083 1.074 1.402 1.071 0.022 1.028 1.115 1.142 0.076 1.002 1.301
pi131esq 0.999 0.001 0.998 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.999 1.000 0.998 0.002 0.995 1.001
hf002_no 20.190 17.064 3.853 1.1E+02 0.628 0.253 0.285 1.383 0.856 0.562 0.237 3.097
hf013_2 0.866 0.600 0.223 3.364 1.884 0.791 0.827 4.289 2.234 1.403 0.652 7.651
ha022_1 0.078 0.128 0.003 1.905 0.669 1.078 0.028 15.739 0.038 0.076 0.001 1.890
hl002_1 0.824 1.079 0.063 10.734 0.395 0.245 0.117 1.332 0.547 0.607 0.062 4.817
pd003 0.178 0.323 0.005 6.195 1.354 2.487 0.037 49.621 0.025 0.053 0.000 1.589
pd003sq 1.018 0.020 0.980 1.058 0.996 0.020 0.958 1.036 1.040 0.024 0.995 1.088
pd004_2 181.956 1125.578 0.001 3.4E+07 0.176 1.059 0.000 2.4E+04 6.7E+04 4.6E+05 0.081 5.5E+10
pd005_1 0.432 0.370 0.081 2.315 0.602 0.313 0.218 1.669 0.598 0.289 0.232 1.543
pt022_3 0.772 0.510 0.211 2.820 1.235 0.532 0.531 2.872 0.401 0.232 0.129 1.249
pm008_ex 97.920 233.316 0.918 1.0E+04 0.281 0.296 0.036 2.210 dropped due to collinearity
c_nl 89.703 98.946 10.325 7.8E+02
hi100hat predicted hi100ecu s.e. bootstrapped normal confidence interval
hi100hsq squared s.e. bootstrapped normal confidence interval
pi110hat predicted pi110ecu s.e. bootstrapped normal confidence interval
pi110hsq squared s.e. bootstrapped normal confidence interval
95% Confidence 
Interval
Declining Industrial regions Agro-Industrial regions Agricultural regions Metropolitan regions

















Table 14 - IE regression
IE
Number of 
obs. used 907 799 20 649
















pe005 0.820 0.298 0.403 1.671 0.838 0.325 0.392 1.791 0.578 0.228 0.267 1.250
hd004 1.137 0.241 0.751 1.721 1.251 0.302 0.780 2.007 1.505 0.234 1.109 2.042
hi100hat 0.851 0.135 0.621 1.166 1.138 0.205 0.796 1.626 0.810 0.166 0.539 1.216
hi100hsq 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.001 1.000 0.000 0.999 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.001
pi110hat 1.082 0.182 0.775 1.511 1.049 0.220 0.691 1.591 1.259 0.344 0.732 2.164
pi110hsq 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
pi132ecu 1.008 0.008 0.993 1.023 1.022 0.011 1.000 1.045 1.007 0.018 0.972 1.043
pi132esq 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
pi133ecu 1.073 0.038 1.000 1.151 1.023 0.034 0.958 1.092 0.932 0.062 0.819 1.061
pi133esq 1.000 0.000 0.999 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.999 1.000 1.002 0.001 1.000 1.004
pi134ecu 1.034 0.035 0.969 1.104 1.022 0.033 0.960 1.088 0.893 0.089 0.735 1.085
pi134esq 1.000 0.000 0.999 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.006 0.003 1.000 1.012
pi135ecu 1.219 0.107 1.026 1.448 0.977 0.059 0.868 1.100 dropped (predicts failure perfectly): 9 obs. not used
pi135esq 0.998 0.001 0.996 1.000 0.999 0.001 0.997 1.002 dropped due to collinearity
hf002_no 0.820 0.293 0.407 1.653 0.759 0.355 0.303 1.898 0.945 0.406 0.407 2.193
hf013_2 0.604 0.223 0.293 1.246 0.707 0.318 0.293 1.708 1.579 0.719 0.647 3.854
ha022_1 0.348 0.414 0.034 3.579 0.295 0.352 0.029 3.054 0.048 0.060 0.004 0.565
hl002_1 1.102 0.686 0.325 3.732 5.683 5.049 0.996 32.418 0.473 0.315 0.128 1.745
pd003 0.425 0.532 0.036 4.952 0.440 0.575 0.034 5.686 0.112 0.155 0.007 1.693
pd003sq 1.009 0.014 0.983 1.036 1.009 0.014 0.981 1.037 1.025 0.015 0.995 1.055
pd004_2 15.647 64.252 0.005 4.9E+04 6.124 26.320 0.001 2.8E+04 346.643 1564.53 0.050 2.4E+06
pd005_1 1.294 0.600 0.522 3.210 1.174 0.593 0.436 3.159 1.568 0.731 0.628 3.910
pt001_1 1.190 0.495 0.526 2.691 2.711 1.827 0.724 10.157 2.428 1.312 0.841 7.003
pt022_3 0.935 0.317 0.481 1.818 0.952 0.331 0.482 1.881 0.714 0.303 0.311 1.639
pm008_ex 18.452 31.916 0.622 5.5E+02 0.038 0.042 0.004 0.328 dropped (predicts failure perfectly): 1 obs. not used
c_nl 4.619 2.884 1.359 15.705
c_be 0.310 0.232 0.072 1.340
c_es 0.019 0.015 0.004 0.088
hi100hat predicted hi100ecu s.e. bootstrapped normal confidence interval
hi100hsq squared s.e. bootstrapped normal confidence interval
pi110hat predicted pi110ecu s.e. bootstrapped normal confidence interval
pi110hsq squared s.e. bootstrapped normal confidence interval
95% Confidence 
Interval









7. Goodness of fit  
 
As already mentioned, understanding the link between the two classifications of labour status can 
help in reducing the dimension of (unexplained) measurement error to be taken into account when 
analysing transition flows using datasets that do not contain the desired classification. 
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Since we try to explain directly the (respondent) measurement error itself, the point is how ‘good’ 
are our estimates, i.e. how big are the residuals from our regressions. 
In a logit setting, there is no obvious measure of fit, differently from the linear case where the 
estimates are derived exactly through maximisation of a measure of fit.   
We propose a measure based on performing a simple ANOVA analysis on the predicted outcome of 
our regression, µ i , on the dependent variable mi : 
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where µ j  ,  j = (0, 1) is the mean predicted probability µ i  for the two groups li = 0 and li = 1.   
 
This is different from Efron’s (1978) fit measure, where the sum of squared errors is related to the 
variance of the dependent variable: 
 
[7]      

















Compared with other measures proposed in the literature sharing the same approach (i.e. comparing 
the distribution of the predicted probability within the two success and failure groups), as that of 
Cramer (1999) we also provide
24,  the ANOVA has the advantage of allowing a simple 
interpretation in terms of percentage of explained variance.  With reference to the figure below, 
Cramer index only compares µ  0  with µ  1 , the mean predicted probability for the two groups. The 
ANOVA index takes into consideration also the moment of degree 2 of the two distributions, and 
compares them with the variance of the overall distribution.  
 
                                                 
24 Cramer suggests to use λ = ( average µ  | mi = 1) - ( average µ  | mi = 0). Anova also compares average values in the 
two different outcome groups, but considers also the variance within those groups.   
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Another classical measure of fit considers an arbitrary cut-off point, x*, and compares the number 
of well classified and wrongly classified observations. A cut-off point of 0.5 is often chosen. This is 
definitely inadequate in most cases, as the position and shape of the two distributions are not 
considered. We look for a cut-off point such that the sum of the frequency of wrongly classified 
observations within the two groups (Σ  =  A1 +   A0) is minimised. This is a particular case of a more 
general approach considering different weights for the two errors, where Σ  =  w1 A1 +   w 0 A 0   is 
minimised, with  w 0 +  w1 = 1. We take this value Σ ,  which is confined in the range between 0 
(perfect discrimination) and 1 (no discrimination), as another measure of fit.  If we accept to make  
few (reasonable) assumptions on the shape of the distributions, the cut-off point that will minimise 
Σ   would also equal A1  and  A0. 
 
Results for the four group show acceptable results for the UI and IU groups, with a reduction in the 
overall variance of 35% and 23%, respectively. The Σ  index
25 is particularly good for the UI group, 
with a value as low as 0.31. This is coherent with the results from our regressions, where we found 
most variables to be significant. UE and IE group can very poorly be explained in terms of 
individual characteristics. While the reduction in the first two types of respondent measurement 
error is significant (although we can’t get any indication on the relative importance of respondent 
and interviewer measurement error from ECHP data), the reduction in the last two types of 
respondent measurement errors is negligible.  
 
 
                                                 
25 the shape of the Σ  functions is showed in the Appendix.   
0             µ 0         x*      µ 1          1  f(Xb)   
g (µ j ) 
A1  A0  
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  Between 
Variance 
Within 
Variance Cramer's λλλλ  
cut-off 
point  ΣΣΣΣ      
           
UI         0.35        305.0        555.2            0.36          0.08          0.31  
           
IU         0.23          60.0        198.0            0.23          0.22          0.52  
           
UE         0.00          29.5     6,608.4            0.26          0.57          0.58  
           




 8. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we used ECHP data to investigate the effect of social, economical and institutional 
factors on labour status perception. We focused on those situations when the individual perception 
differs from the categorisation offered by the LFS (and imputed in the ECHP data), based on ILO 
definitions of employment, unemployment and participation to the labour force. We offered an 
explanation for the misperception, and described four main groups of ‘borderline’ individuals, the 
most interesting being those who declare to be unemployed while recorded as inactive, and those 
who declare to be inactive when recorded as unemployed. The first group is overemphasizing the 
job seeking efforts, while the second is underemphasizing them. ‘Victimisation’, i.e. considering 
society in general responsible for an individual’s current working situation, and the discouragement  
associated with it, is shown to be the main cause for being in this group. Such an attitude is 
(paradoxically) reinforced by assistance from the state itself, such that belonging to this group 
becomes ‘institutionalised’. These people do not compare in the unemployment statistics, but 
amount to an overall 35% of all (‘official’) unemployed workers in the European Union. This figure 
is around 30% in Italy, Germany, France, Ireland, reaching 50% and beyond in Portugal, Austria, 
Denmark and passing that of recorded unemployed in Belgium and the Netherlands. It is around 
10% in Great Britain and Greece. These individuals are more or less dissatisfied as their ‘official’ 
counterparts, they vote, and thus would deserve the same attention as their more visible cousins. But 
bringing a little bit of hope and a little searching practice to them would increase the overall 
unemployment rate in the EU of as much as 3%! 
 
People underemphasizing their search efforts on the other side can normally rely on a family safety 
net (married women…), but their attitude is again reinforced by ‘institutional’ care. Also quite 
interesting are those part-time workers that declare to be either unemployed or inactive, since they 
could signal a positive attitude in dealing with their main status. 
 
All the evidence provided in this paper points to an inadequacy of labour statistics in keeping track 
of the complex reality of work and leisure time, an inadequacy that has a significant impact on the 
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Table A1- Persons by current activity status (ECHP versus LFS, 1994 and 1995) 
 
  Wave 1  Wave 2 
  Working %  Unemployed % (1)  Working %  Unemployed % (1) 
  ECHP  LFS ECHP  LFS ECHP  LFS ECHP  LFS 
B  50  46 5 5  48  46 3 5 
DK  61  59 6 5  63  60 4 5 
D  55  53 5 5  56  53 4 5 
EL  46  45 8 4  43  45 5 4 
F  41 37 12 12 40 37 11 11 
IRL  46  48 7 7  50  49 5 7 
I  46  46 9 8  50  48 6 6 
L  44  42 8 5  43  42 7 6 
NL  53  52 2 2  53  49 2 2 
A  54  55 4 4  57  55 3 4 
P  59  54 4 4  57  57 2 2 
UK  58  56 6 6  57  54 3 4 
          
(1) over population aged 25-64 
Source: ECHP data quality, second report, pp. 45.  
 
 
Table A2- Unemployment and participation rates (ECHP versus LFS, 1994, 1995, 1996) 
 
 Unemployment  %  Participation  % 
 ECHP  LFS    ECHP  LFS 
Italy 
wave 2  13.9%  11.9  49.4%  47.4 
wave 3  14.1%  12.1  44.3%  47.7 
Germany 
wave 2  6.7%  8.2  59.5%  57.7 
wave 3  6.0%  8.8  59.0%  57.6 
Great Britain 
wave 2  8.8%  8.7  62.5%  61.5 
wave 3  7.5%  8.2  61.7%  61.6 
Portugal 
wave 2  5.7%  7.3  59.8%  58.1 
wave 3  5.1%  7.4  58.9%  57.7 
Netherlands 
wave 2  4.7%  7  58.8%  59.2 
wave 3  6.1%  6.2  60.0%  59.7 
Belgium 
wave 2  6.5%  9.4  49.7%  50.5 
wave 3  11.6%  9.6  50.7%  50.4 
Spain 
wave 2  21.3%  23.1  52.3%  48.2 
wave 3  22.1%  22.5  50.2%  48.8 
France 
wave 2  9.9%  11.3  56.8%  55.4 
wave 3  11.0%  12  56.6%  55.8 
Greece 
wave 2  11.0%  9.1  49.1%  49.2 
wave 3  10.7%  9.7  49.7%  49.7 
Denmark 
wave 2  6.3%  7.4  67.7%  64.6 
wave 3  5.9%  7.4  65.7%  65.2 
Austria 
wave 2  4.0%  3.9  56.8%  59.4 
wave 3  4.1%  4.5  58.5%  58.8 
Ireland 
wave 1  16.5%  14.7  54.8%  53.9 
wave 2  11.3%  12.2  55.6%  53.9 
wave 3  10.8%  11.8  55.4%  54.9 
Luxemburg 
wave 2  3.0%  2.8  55.5%  50.8 
wave 3  3.7%  3.1  51.7%  51 
Finland 
wave 3  17.1%  15.5  59.0%  59.4  
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Table A3 - LFS main activity during current year 
 
Codes Labels 
1  normally working (working 15+ hours / week) 
2  currently working (working less than 15 hours / week) 
3 unemployed 
4 discouraged  worker 
5 economically  inactive 
-9 missing 
 
Source: ECHP – UDB, data dictionary and description of variables 
 
Table A4 - Variable construction rule 
 
working at present at least 15 h/w or temporarily absent for some reason (vacation, sickness, bad weather, labour dispute, maternity 
leave…) 
1 
else  any work in a job or business during the past 7 days, even if this was only for one or a few hours  2 
  else  available to start within two weeks and active search to find a job  3 
    available to start within two weeks and received a job offer during past 4 weeks  3 
    available to start within two weeks and no active search because believe no suitable work available   4 
    available to start within two weeks and and no active search because already found work, to start in 




no job but 
is looking 
for a job 
else  5 
    available to start within two weeks and no active search because engaged in other activity (study, 
training, community or military service)  
4 
    available to start within two weeks and no active search because and already found work, to start in 




no job and 
is not 
looking 
for a job  else  5 
  else    -9 
Source: ECHP Variable Construction Manual – European Commission Doc. Pan 167/01, adapted by the authors 
 
Please note that code 2 of LFS classification has a misleading label (“working less than 15 hours a 
week”). In facts, respondents are assigned code 2 if they declare not to have a regular job involving 
at least 15 hours a week, but to have done some kind of work in any job or business in the week 
prior to the interview. A more appropriate label would thus be “temporary or part-time work”. 




Table A5 – Eligibility for objectives 1 and 2 and regional classification 
 
EU nut label  eli1  eli2  group 
        
at OSTERREICH     2 
at1 OSTOSTERREICH  P  P 2 
at2 SUDOSTERREICH  N  P 1 
at3 WESTOSTERREICH  N  P 1 
be BELGIQUE-BELGIE  P  P 2 
be1 BRUXELLES  N  N  3 
be2 VLAAMS  GEWEST  N  P  1 
be3 REGION  WALLONE  P  P  2 
de BR  DEUTSCHLAND  P  P 2 
dk DANMARK  N  P 1 
es ESPAÑA  P  P 2 
es1 NOROESTE  T  N  4 
es2 NORESTE  N  P  1 
es3 MADRID  N  P  1 
es4 CENTRO  (E)  T  N  4 
es5 ESTE  P  P  2 
es6 SUR  T  N  4 
es7 CANARIAS  T  N  4 
fi SUOMI/FINLAND  N  P  1 
fi1 MANNER-SUOMI  N  P 1 
fi2 AHVENANMAA/ALAND  N  P 1 
fr FRANCE  P  P  2 
fr1 ILE  DE  FRANCE  N  N 3 
fr2 BASSIN  PARISIEN  N  N 3 
fr3 NORD-PAS-DE-CALAIS  P  P 2 
fr4 EST  N  P 1 
fr5 OUEST  N  P 1 
fr6 SUD-OUEST  N  P 1 
fr7 CENTRE-EST  N  P 1 
fr8 MEDITERRANEE  P  P 2 
gr ELLADA  T  N  4 
gr1 VOREIA  ELLADA  T  N 4 
gr2 KENTRIKI  ELLADA  T  N 4 
gr3 ATTIKI  T  N 4 
gr4 NISIA  T  N 4 
ie IRELAND  T  N  4 
it ITALIA  P  P  2 
it1 NORD  OVEST  N  P 1 
it2 LOMBARDIA  N  P 1 
it3 NORD  EST  N  P 1 
it4 EMILIA-ROMAGNA  N  P 1 
it5 CENTRO  (I)  N  P 1 
it6 LAZIO  N  P 1 
it7 ABRUZZI-MOLISE  T  N  4 
it8 CAMPANIA  T  N  4 
it9 SUD  T  N  4 
ita SICILIA  T  N  4 
itb SARDEGNA  T  N  4 
lu LUXEMBOURG  N  P  1 
nl NEDERLAND  P  P  2 
nl1 NOORD-NEDERLAND  N  P 1 
nl2 OOST-NEDERLAND  P  P 2 
nl3 WEST-NEDERLAND  N  N 3 
nl4 ZUID-NEDERLAND  N  P 1 
pt PORTUGAL  T  N  4 
pt1 CONTINENTE  T  N 4 
pt11 NORTE  T N  4 
pt12 CENTRO  T N  4 
pt13  LISBOA E VALE DO TEJO  T  N  4 
pt14 ALENTEJO  T N  4 
pt15 ALGARVE  T N  4 
pt2 ACORES  T  N 4 
pt3 MADEIRA  T  N 4 
uk UNITED  KINGDOM  P  P 2 
uk1 NORTH  N  P  1 
uk2  YORKSHIRE & HUMBERSIDE  N  P  1 
uk3 EAST  MIDLANDS  N  P  1 
uk4 EAST  ANGLIA  N  N  3 
uk5 SOUTH  EAST  (UK)  N  P  1 
uk6  SOUTH WEST (UK)  N  P  1 
uk7 WEST  MIDLANDS  N  P  1 
uk8 NORTH  WEST  (UK)  P  P  2 
uk9 WALES  N  P  1 
uka SCOTLAND  P  P  2 




Table A6 - Observations with missing regional information (excluded from the sample): 
 
country Freq.  Percent 
    
Denmark 61  1.53 
Belgium 6  0.15 
Luxembourg 78  1.95 
France 1402  35.1 
United-Kingdom 49  1.23 
Ireland 663  16.6 
Italy 33  0.83 
Greece 706  17.68 
Spain 61  1.53 
Portugal 789  19.75 
Austria 146  3.66 
Total 3994  100.00  
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Table A7 - Auxiliary Income regressions 
 
         
Tobit estimates  Number of obs  =  66283    
    LR chi2(8)  =  1432.35    
    Prob > chi2  =  0    
Log likelihood =  -436386.6 Pseudo R2  =  0.0016    
         
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
hi100ecu  Coef.  Std.Err.  t        P>|t|  [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pe005 0.687  0.077  8.958  0.000  0.537  0.837
pe005sq -0.006  0.001  -4.899  0.000  -0.008  -0.004
ha022_1 -1.809  1.989  -0.909  0.363  -5.707  2.090
pd003 6.861  0.337  20.366  0.000  6.201  7.521
pd003sq -0.077  0.004  -19.084  0.000  -0.085  -0.069
pd004_2 12.304  1.445  8.518  0.000  9.473  15.135
ph001 -24.954  0.890  -28.032  0.000  -26.699  -23.210
pm008_ex 4.893  6.790  0.721  0.471  -8.415  18.202
_cons 151.111  6.896  21.912  0.000  137.594  164.627
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
_se 179.865  0.496  (Ancillary  parameter)   
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         
Obs. summary:         338 left-censored observations at hi100ecu<=0   




         
Tobit estimates  Number of obs  =  66283    
    LR chi2(8)  =  17146.43    
    Prob > chi2  =  0    
Log likelihood =  -356123.6 Pseudo R2  =  0.0235    
         
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pi110ecu  Coef.  Std.Err.  t        P>|t|  [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
pe005 5.259  0.059  89.010  0.000  5.144  5.375
pe005sq -0.044  0.001  -50.711  0.000  -0.046  -0.042
ha022_1 5.273  1.363  3.867  0.000  2.600  7.945
pd003 11.817  0.239  49.501  0.000  11.349  12.285
pd003sq -0.127  0.003  -44.293  0.000  -0.133  -0.121
pd004_2 -25.581  0.994  -25.736  0.000  -27.529  -23.633
ph001 -13.989  0.617  -22.672  0.000  -15.198  -12.780
pm008_ex 0.368  4.695  0.078  0.937  -8.834  9.571
_cons -229.066  4.912  -46.635  0.000  -238.693  -219.438
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
_se 120.057  0.365  (Ancillary  parameter)   
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         
Obs. summary:         10114 left-censored observations at pi110ecu<=0   
   56159  uncensored  observations     
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Figure A1 – determination of Σ   
 
             
 
        
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
 
 
        
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
 
 
 
 
 